Status of Medical Device Reprocessor/Refurbisher Liability

Courtney S. Young, Esq. |Senior Attorney, Medmarc Risk Management

Status of Reprocessor Liability

The recent pressures to drive down the cost of medical care have given way to a practice of using medical devices (even so-called “single-use devices”) a greater number of times, on a greater number of patients, before disposing of them. To accomplish this, hospitals are increasingly using reprocessors to sterilize and re-validate their devices between uses. Although device reprocessing is nothing new, the increase in demand has largely altered the general practice from one in which hospitals sent its devices to a reprocessor and got those exact units back after reprocessing, to one in which the reprocessor provides the hospital with the same model of devices that the hospital submitted but not necessarily the same specific units submitted. This allows for a faster turn-around time.  In this process, the reprocessor may often re-serialize the devices and alter the labels, warnings, or instructions for use, hopefully to account for any additional precautions medical personnel must need to take in light of the manner of reprocessing.

FDA Regulation

Medical device refurbishing is an interesting area right now as it has recently become a focus for FDA and a potential subject of new regulation. Last Spring, the FDA sought industry feedback on proposed definitions including repair, refurbish, remanufacture, recondition, and remarket. At the same time, the Agency also solicited answers to questions about the risks and failure modes introduced as a result of performing these activities on medical devices, and whether the risks were different depending on who performs the activities (hospitals, OEMs, third parties). Thus far, though over 200 comments were submitted in response to these questions, there has not been any further movement from the FDA in this area. Many have speculated that when the Agency does take action, it will likely be to bring refurbishers under the same oversight scheme as reprocessors of single-use devices.

Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc.

Although the presence of reprocessors in the chain of distribution presumably has products liability implications for the original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs), few cases have addressed the issue of strict products liability for manufacturers when a device malfunctions after it has been reprocessed or refurbished. The most recent case that really explored this issue was Kapps v. Biosence Webster, 813 F.Supp.2d 1128 (D.Minn. 2011), a case that came out of the Federal District Court of Minnesota in 2011. Though several years old now, the Court’s analysis provides some valuable insights into distinctions that may be important in deciphering products liability apportionment between OEMs and reprocessors. It’s easy to extrapolate that similar reasoning would apply to refurbishers.

In Kapps, the plaintiff was an atrial fibrillation patient that underwent a procedure in which doctors used a “lasso catheter” that had been reprocessed.  During the surgery, the lasso portion of the catheter separated and remained entangled in the plaintiff’s mitral valve. It was eventually able to be removed by the doctors, but the damage that was sustained to the plaintiff’s mitral valve in the process necessitated additional open-heart surgery and replacement of his damaged valve with a prosthesis.

The plaintiff brought the usual products liability claims—manufacturing defect, warning defect, design defect, breach of warranty, and negligence—against both the OEM and the reprocessor.

The Court held:

  1. Plaintiff cannot rely on res ipsa loquitor to establish the OEM’s liability for manufacturing defects.

Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine used in negligence and products liability actions when the plaintiff has incurred some harm, but obvious difficulties may make too difficult for the plaintiff to prove the exact origin of the cause of harm. In order to utilize res ipsa, plaintiffs (generally) must first establish both that (1) the accident—here, the defect in the product—is the kind that would usually be caused by negligence; and (2) that the defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality that caused the accident—here, the manufacture and composition of the device.  In disallowing the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa against the OEM, the Court relied on the fact that at the time of injury, the reprocessed device could not be said to have been in the same condition it was when it left the OEM’s control. In effect, the second prong was not satisfied as the OEM did not have exclusive control over the condition of the catheter once the reprocessor was used.

  1. Claims against the reprocessor are viable under theory of res ipsa loquitor.

In contrast, because the reprocessor did have exclusive control over the condition of the catheter as it was at the time of the injury, the Court held that res ipsa loquitur could be applied to the negligence claim against the reprocessor.

  1. An OEM that markets its device as single use will be immunized against the claim that it nonetheless should have foreseen and warned that a reprocessor might ignore the single-use instructions.

In Kapps, the OEM of the catheter has specifically labeled the device, and included in its instructions for use, that it was intended for single use only. Nonetheless, the plaintiff claimed that the OEM should have foreseen that the catheter would likely still be reprocessed despite such instructions, and warned accordingly of the dangers of reprocessing. The Court rejected this claim.

  1. Reprocessor carried a manufacturer’s duties to warn and to provide a defect-free product, because it acted (a) replaced the OEM’s instructions for use and product serial numbers with its own; (b) warranted the functionality of the reprocessed device; and (3) marketed the product as its own equivalent to the OEM’s.

The reprocessor responded to the warning-defect allegations of the plaintiff’s by asserting that the duty to warn should lie only with the OEM. The Court did not find this argument compelling, and instead held that the reprocessor in these circumstances indeed had the same duty to warn as an OEM has.

Kapps can provide helpful guidance for OEMs and reprocessors alike.  For OEMs, it may be reassuring that they may not be strictly liable for manufacturing defects after the their device has been reprocessed, but they must be careful to include warnings and instructions for reprocessing and its dangers if in fact their device is not designated for single use only. Reprocessors should be mindful of enlarging their own products liability when they mix, re-serialize, and alter the warnings and labels of an OEM’s devices.

State Statutes

In the years since Kapps, courts haven’t been asked to reconsider the issue of reprocessor/refurbishers liability hasn’t come before the courts again, so it’s the best indication we’ve got as to how courts are likely to treat reprocessor liability going forward. That said, several states aren’t waiting for the courts to decide, and some have enacted statutes specifically deeming reprocessors and refurbishers to have the same liability with respect to a defective device as original manufacturers. See, e.g., Utah’s statute, U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-4-505. Liability of reprocessor of single-use medical devices.

Conclusion

The safest course for reprocessors and refurbishers of medical devices is probably to assume that they may stand in the shoes of the OEM if something goes wrong with the device they process. In doing so, they should implement a quality management system and undertake the same robust risk management practices of which successful OEMs make use.

Venue, Preemption Issues Dot Legal Landscape

The Supreme Court has been busy of late on several fronts of interest to those in the life sciences, and may be busier yet if it accepts a case dealing with preemption. The Court decided a case recently dealing with venue, but there is some disagreement as to how much that decision clarified the questions at hand.

Is Lohr back in play?

Those who find the PMA preemption discussion fascinating will enjoy the potential for a reexamination of preemption for class II devices if the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert for a case addressing surgical meshes. One of the more interesting aspects of this case is that any push for 510(k) preemption might be due to more stringent requirements for these applications imposed by the FDA over the past few years.

J&J subsidiary Ethicon requested cert for Ethicon v. Huskey, which takes up a synthetic surgical mesh applied for stress urinary incontinence. The jury trial returned an award of more than $3 million for the plaintiff, and Ethicon appealed the case on the grounds that the judge in the first trial disallowed evidence as to the company’s adherence to FDA premarket requirements, along with several other bits of regulatory information related to the device.

The appeals court sided with the district court, citing with the Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as justification for omitting the evidence in question, but the appeals court decision also argued that 510(k) filings only “tangentially” deal with safety and efficacy. The court cited Medtronic v. Lohr without comment in this section, which seems likely to provoke a discussion as to whether the FDA’s increasing demands from FDA for 510(k) filings begins to approach the threshold for specificity that is the foundation for PMA preemption. Or at least that’s the argument device makers are inclined to make.

Either way, Lohr dealt with the statute as it existed in 1982, when the FDA cleared the Model 4011 pacemaker, and thus changes imposed by Congress since then, including the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, were not considered. This legislation was driven almost entirely by concerns about the tracking of adverse events for class II devices, but the Supreme Court decision in Lohr claimed that a typical 510(k) review takes only 20 hours as opposed to the average of 1,200 hours needed to review a PMA filing.

Whether those times still hold is difficult to know, but the most recent FDA performance report for the soon-to-expire device user fee agreement suggests that overall PMA review times are down to 163 FDA days while the target for 510(k) review times is still 90 FDA days. The question one might ask oneself is: If it takes the FDA 90 days to get through 20 hours of review time for a 510(k), how can it take only 163 days to put 1,200 hours into a PMA?

Venue, vidi, vici

Those who see the question of forum shopping in a negative light might be encouraged by a recent decision in the Supreme Court that seems to put the clamps on this practice. The fact that the decision in Heartland v. Kraft was unanimous would seem to bring the venue question to a thunderous close, but there is some skepticism as to whether the question is fully answered.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the 8-0 decision in Heartland  – Justice Neil Gorsuch did not take part – and said that §1400 of Title 21 of the U.S. Code was unaffected by congressional modification of Title 21’s §1391. Thomas also pointed to Fourco Glass v. Transmirra Products, the 1957 case in which the Supreme Court declared that the word “resides” means the location of incorporation for a U.S. domestic company.

Former PTO director Todd Dickinson noted that the outcome leaves a few questions unanswered about cases that are already in process, but he also said that stand-alone legislation by Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) directed toward venue might be futile. On the other hand, former Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Orrin Hatch said he will draft a bill to take up the vexatious venue problem, so there is clearly some interest on Capitol Hill.

There are those who believe that Heartland might influence whether patent litigants will resort to multidistrict litigation to go after infringers. The America Invents Act disallowed the use of joinder based merely on the charge that each of the named defendants infringed the same patent, and Heartland would seem to suggest that a patent holder will spend a lot more time on the road in pursuit of damages, although a lot of potential targets are located in Delaware thanks to that state’s status as the home of the limited liability corporation.

Multidistrict litigation might seem a handy way to pursue infringers in numerous jurisdictions, but MDLs are infrequently used for patent cases. Would the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) be persuaded by an application to consolidate patent lawsuits when only half a dozen or so defendants are named? By some accounts, patent MDLs currently account for less than 5 percent of all MDLs, although this might reflect nothing more than underutilization.

Still, it seems plausible that a plaintiff will have to identify a very similar set of allegations for a given number of defendants in order to prod the JPML into action. A lack of sheer numbers presents one problem, but the combination of small numbers and dissimilar allegations could prove fatal to an effort to consolidate patent lawsuits via the JPML.

U.S. Supreme Court Clamps Down on Mass Tort State Court Lawsuits

Jordan Lipp | Partner, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP

Yesterday morning, in an 8-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs who did not reside in California could not sue Bristol-Myers Squibb in California.  The decision is the latest one in a string of decisions from the United States Supreme Court, which are limiting the scope of personal jurisdiction – i.e., where a company can get sued.  The question of where a company can or cannot get sued is one of the most important issues in defending lawsuits against life science companies.  And this lawsuit is a classic example of these issues.

As discussed more in earlier blog posts as we’ve followed this litigation, this appeal involved personal jurisdiction issues in a case where 678 individuals, consisting of 86 California residents and 592 nonresidents, all alleged adverse consequences from the use of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s drug Plavix.  Bristol-Myers Squibb is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in New York City, with substantial operations in New Jersey.  The lawsuits were filed in San Francisco Superior Court.  Bristol-Myers Squibb challenged the jurisdiction of California courts to hear the claims of plaintiffs who did not reside in California.  While the California Supreme Court found there was no general jurisdiction (i.e., whether a defendant can be sued in the forum regardless of whether the case is related to the forum), the California Supreme Court found that there was specific jurisdiction (i.e., case-linked jurisdiction) due to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s “wide ranging” contacts with California.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court.  As “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California,” the United States Supreme Court Court found specific jurisdiction lacking.  Specific jurisdiction in these circumstances is absent no matter how many other connections Bristol-Myers Squibb had to California, no matter how many California residents had sued Bristol-Myers Squibb for the same conduct in California, and no matter how efficient having combined litigation  in California might be.  While hardly a surprising ruling, this decision could have far reaching consequences in large-scale drug and device litigation.  While a drug or device company can be sued in the state in which it is headquartered or incorporated (i.e., the concept of general jurisdiction), it will be much harder for plaintiffs to sue drug and device companies in any other plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions.  Rather, this Bristol-Myers Squibb decision will continue the trend in confining plaintiffs to suing drug and device company only in their own home-state, or where the drug or device company is headquartered / incorporated.

Biosimilars, Biostatisticians, and the New EEU

There are very few days during which the worlds of drugs and medical devices are entirely quiescent, thanks to very active American courts and international regulatory churn. There is some good news in all this, but how good is it?

If you’re in the biosimilars business, the latest news is quite good, indeed.

SCOTUS rules for Sandoz

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 12 that makers of biosimilars do not have to wait six months after the issuance of a biologics license application to begin marketing that product, a development that could bring some less costly biotech drugs to market more quickly and possibly take a bite out of spending on these agents.

In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Sandoz in Sandoz v. Amgen, a case that made a stop at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where the outcome was quite different. Sandoz had argued that the terms of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 had essentially worked to add half a year of exclusivity to the 12 years already granted by the statute, and by some accounts, Sandoz’s Zarxio is about 15 percent less expensive than Amgen’s Neupogen, a drug for chemotherapy-induced neutropenia.

The news might not change the field dramatically in the near term, given that the FDA has approved only about half a dozen biosimilars to date, but one possible candidate for a quick entry to market is an oncology biosimilar for Avastin, which will undergo an FDA advisory committee review in mid-July. In an ironic twist, Amgen teamed up with Allergan to produce this biosimilar.

Expert witness refuted in Zoloft lawsuit

Pfizer scored a victory in the running lawsuit pertaining to the company’s flagship antidepressant Zoloft, but what may have been the most interesting part of this story is that a court rejected expert testimony relating to allegations that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) causes congenital heart defects.

The decision may have brought to a close an effort by more than 300 litigants, which absorbed a second consecutive negative outcome in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Both the appeals court and a district court decreed that the expert witness, Nicholas Jewell, a biostatistician at the University of California at Berkeley, had failed to plausibly link the drug to the birth defects. Among the problems with Jewell’s presentation is that he had rejected meta-analyses he had previously cited in a separate lawsuit pertaining to another SSRI.

Whether the plaintiffs will take this lawsuit any further is difficult to forecast, but a footnote on page 10 of the Appeals Court decision remarked that the plaintiffs’ attorneys had conceded that they are “unable to establish general causation” if the courts jettisoned Jewell’s testimony. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Pfizer.

This is not the only multi-district litigation keeping attorneys at Pfizer busy, however. A very active set of lawsuits dealing with proton pump inhibitors and purportedly associated kidney damage would seem to implicate the OTC version of Nexium, marketing rights for which Pfizer picked up five years ago in a deal with AstraZeneca. The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) declined in January to consolidate these lawsuits, but another motion for consolidation has been filed by attorneys with Seeger Weiss of New York.

Regulations, regulatory agreements on the move

Efforts to ramp up medical device regulatory schemes in outside-U.S. jurisdictions are nothing new, but device makers can add Malaysia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to the list of national and international entities diving into deeper regulatory waters. The news for device makers is somewhat mixed, but greater clarity alone is sometimes enough to overcome other considerations.

First, Malaysia’s Medical Device Authority has declared that adverse events associated with medical devices will have to be reported to the agency within 30 days. This apparently applies to all devices that are on the Malaysian market, regardless of where the adverse event took place. Any fatalities have to be reported within 10 days, and device makers have a mere 48 hours to advise the agency of any problems that might carry a public health consideration.

The EEU continues to work toward a single market for drugs and devices, a move which if successful would capture the markets of Russia and four other nations for a total 2015 population of nearly 184 million. There are reports that Tehran is interested in a free trade agreement with the EEU, although there is no indication that Iran would take part this new med tech regulatory bloc despite the deepening geopolitical ties with Moscow. Serbia is likewise said to be interested in doing business with the EEU, but it’s not clear whether Belgrade has full-blown membership in mind, either, although the protracted and difficult negotiations for entry into the European Union might strike some as suggestive.

To date, the EEU regulatory regime lacks several critical documents, such as a framework for quality management systems. Registration requirements for this international regulatory system would be phased in over the next four years, however, giving industry a little breathing room for offerings already available in this market.

Of Combo Products and High Courts

Tourists to our nation’s capital can always find plenty to do, and the same can be said for those in the life sciences with an ear for crucial policy matters. Following are two items of interest to makers of FDA-regulated products, one of which may have a significant influence over FDA regulation over an increasingly important class of medical products, while the other addresses federal prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.

Misgivings regarding the FDA’s CPPC

The FDA’s Combination Products Policy Council (CPPC) has a pretty serious lift in front of it, not the least of which is the thorny problem of differences in culture and attitude at the various centers that will be caught up in these combo product applications.

For some time, it has been known that many reviewers at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research are no fans of the 510(k) program, apparently seeing it as an unforgivably fast track to market. Of course, the notion of substantial equivalence is a stranger in a strange land at CDER, which might explain a lot of the antipathy toward 510(k) devices there.

The agency opened a docket at regulations.gov in January, seeking feedback on topics the CPPC might address, and as might be expected, some of the consternation has to do with the process for determining a combo product’s primary mode of action. One concern in particular is how the agency will go about determining what sort of evidence will be needed to establish a product’s PMOA.

Other concerns relate to procedures for handling inter-center disputes regarding PMOA when the Office of Combination Products seems unable to broker a conflict. On the other hand, some have indicated that the interactive review process at CDER is more cumbersome than at the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, and thus would add time to what already promises to be a difficult review process.

One issue that was not conspicuous in comments to the docket was that of user fees. A sponsor will obviously have to pay more if the product’s PMOA is declared to be that of a drug, but what about fee sharing between centers? Will the lead center share user fees with the other center or centers? That’s not clear, and while reviewers at CDRH might find the drug user fees more than adequate, reviewers at CDER might find the device fee schedule unacceptably miserly.

SCOTUS says no to DeCoster

In one of the more interesting Park doctrine cases of recent vintage, the Supreme Court has opted not to hear arguments in the case of Decoster v. U.S., which allows to stand a three-month jail sentence imposed on the father-son ownership team in the egg business.

Many members of the bar see DeCoster as an outlier in that it entailed a jail sentence for Jack and Peter DeCoster, who are said to have been unaware of the violative behavior going on at their company, but more important is the prospect that this case will serve as a precedent for federal prosecutors who want to imprison those in the food, drug and device industries for problematic products. The high court’s decision to pass on the case means the two men will serve their jail sentences, but it also suggests that the Supreme Court will not hear this case until an appeals court other than U.S. Eight Appeals renders a different verdict in a similar case.

It may be an odd source of comfort to note that federal prosecutors will likely try out this new enforcement tool fairly promptly, which suggests that a different appeals court will have a crack at this question in fairly short order. Understandably, nobody in the food, drug or device business wants to serve as the subject of that case, but industry as a whole might want to see this question resolved as quickly as possible.

There is some question as to whether the current composition of the Supreme Court makes this the ideal time to take up such a case, but it’s difficult to predict which of the justices will be the next to leave the Court. Ruth Bader Ginsberg is a leading candidate for retirement because of her age (84), but Anthony Kennedy is no kid, either, as his 81st birthday is fast approaching. A Trump administration replacement for Ginsburg would seem to guarantee DeCoster will be overturned, but those in search of a predictable legal environment might say sooner is better, regardless of the prospects for churn at 1 First St. NE in our nation’s capital.

Petition for Cert Revisits Park Doctrine

Those in the life sciences need little or no explanation regarding the implications of Park doctrine, but this relatively relaxed threshold for federal criminal prosecution may soon undergo a scrub-down at the Supreme Court of the U.S. Whether the Court will conclude the time is ripe to revisit Park doctrine is tough to predict, particularly since the acting Solicitor General has argued that this case deserves none of the Court’s attention. Nonetheless, there is a new justice at the Supreme Court, one whose track record suggests a degree of skepticism about deference to the federal government’s position on legal matters.

Jail time at heart of debate

The case of Decoster v. U.S. revolves around a three-month jail sentence imposed on the father-son team of Jack and Peter DeCoster, whose Quality Egg LLC company was charged in connection with an outbreak of Salmonella in 2010. The DeCosters agreed to pay personal fines of $100,000 each, and Quality Egg gave up nearly $7 million as well.

Prosecutors were unable to offer evidence that the DeCosters were aware that the company was shipping tainted eggs, and thus the three-month sentence imposed in the district court hearing is seen as a break with routine sentencing practice under Park doctrine. The district court judge concluded that the duo had acted negligently, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit upheld the jail term by a 2-1 vote. Subsequently, a request for an en banc hearing at the Eight Circuit was denied, whereupon counsel for the defendants petitioned the Supreme Court to take the case.

In response to the petition, acting Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall argued that the petitioners had effectively waived “any challenge to the statutory basis for their convictions” with their guilty pleas in district court, a state of affairs that carried over to the appeals court proceedings. Wall is unlikely to hold onto the job, given that the White House has named Noel Francisco, formerly a partner at Jones Day, as the administration’s pick for the position. Little or nothing has happened since the White House mentioned Francisco, however, so it may that Wall’s is the only name from the Solicitor General’s office the Supreme Court will hear in connection with DeCoster before deciding whether to grant cert.

WLF cites ‘disturbing trend’ in federal cases

In marked contrast to the position staked out by the federal government, the Washington Legal Foundation – no stranger to controversies surrounding federal prosecution of FDA-regulated entities – has written in support of a Supreme Court review, citing a “disturbing trend at the federal level to criminalize normal, everyday business decisions.” WLF argued that the prison sentence “vastly expands the scope of the Park doctrine beyond constitutional limits,” and that should this outcome develop into a trend, “it will become intolerably risky to be an executive in the food and drug industries” in the U.S.

Also on record with a friend-of-the-court brief is the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, but that may not be the last of the organizations that will weigh in on this matter. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and the Cato Institute both made their opposition to the jail term known as the case made its way through the lower courts, a clear sign that this case has piqued the interest of a wide range of stakeholders.

Companies in the life sciences will certainly want to track this case closely, particularly since the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the bench would seem to suggest that the Court would at least be open to the notion that the district court was out of bounds in imposing a jail sentence. There is little to indicate that Gorsuch has a track record in Park doctrine cases, but he has exhibited a willingness to question the practice of judicial deference to the positions staked out by the executive branch. That skepticism on Gorsuch’s part offers some hope that the Court will not simply accept at face value the Solicitor General’s opinion that this case merits no review.

Multi-district Litigation; (Lack of) Evidence and Pending Legislation

Multi-district litigation (MDL) has its advantages even for defendants, but some see abuses, including a recent case involving an orthopedic device maker’s metal-on-metal hip implants. There is legislation in circulating on Capitol Hill that might address some of the problems associated with these mass actions, but the Trump administration and the House GOP have their hands full, raising the prospect that any corrective legislation might languish.

No evidence? No problem
Device maker Biomet faces an MDL case that took a new twist recently when a judge in Indiana dismissed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims of six plaintiffs in the product liability suit. A pretrial order filed in 2013 had required that plaintiffs find some means of preserving the device components in order to be eligible for the action, and several of the plaintiffs indicated that health care practitioners either refused or failed to send the devices along before the MDL commenced. One of the plaintiffs managed to recover the device and kept it in a plastic bag in a closet, but made no mention of this until she was deposed.

Judge Robert Miller of the District Court for the District of Northern Indiana decreed that the five plaintiffs who never recovered their devices could not be excluded from the MDL because those explants took place prior to the start of the MDL. Biomet’s attorneys argued spoliation as a cause for dismissal of these plaintiffs, but Miller expressed the view that these litigants could not be excluded because there was no demonstration of bad faith on their parts. As for the sixth plaintiff, her failure to handle the device appropriately seemed to have no effect on her eligibility for the MDL due to an absence of any indication that her failure to disclose her possession of the article was anything more than an oversight.

Courts are said to have considerable leeway in determining when spoliation sanctions should be applied, but defendants may be concerned that Miller’s determination could dilute the value of spoliation. There is also the lingering question of the circumstances in which a device maker is liable for devices that are made unavailable for examination because they are disposed of prior to the start of an MDL procedure.

Spoliation not mentioned, but …
The Fairness in Class Litigation Action Act of 2017, sponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) has made its way into the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The bill states that among its purposes is to “diminish abuses in class action and mass tort litigation that are undermining the integrity” of the legal system.

While the bill does not seem to directly address spoliation, section 5 of the bill specifically calls out MDLs. This portion of the legislation would require that plaintiff’s counsel offer evidence in support of the claim of injury as well as “the alleged cause of that injury.” The filing of such information must take place within 45 days of the transfer of the legal action or be “directly filed in the proceedings.” Should that information not show up in the judge’s hands within the following 30 days, that plaintiff is excluded, and the bill states further that these deadlines “shall not be extended.” The text says little about what would constitute evidence in support of a claim of injury, however.

Another interesting feature of Goodlatte’s bill is that it limits attorney fees to 20 percent of the monies recovered, and any disputes about this provision would be handled by the judge who handled the pretrial proceedings. Whether this feature will tamp down some of the legal adventurism said to characterize MDLs is up for grabs, but corporate attorneys can’t help but cheer this feature (and others) of this legislation.

And despite the distractions posed by health care and tax reform, the presence of a GOP majority on both sides of Capitol Hill offers the most favorable conditions for tort reform of any kind than have been seen at any time in the past decade, particularly since a Republican holds the Oval Office for the first time in eight years.